The World Health Organization’s (WHO) mandate is universal: "to attain by all peoples the highest possible level of health." While often reduced in public discourse to an opaque UN bureaucracy, a manager of pandemics, or a provider of aid to low-income countries, the WHO is in reality an indispensable infrastructure that enables national health systems, including France’s, to function more effectively, often in ways that remain unseen by the general public. Though not without its imperfections, and not designed to compensate for the shortcomings of individual states, the WHO nonetheless establishes the minimal conditions for cooperation without which national health sovereignties become largely ineffective.

The COVID-19 pandemic starkly reminded the world of a reality too often ignored: the health sovereignty of nations does not equate to complete autonomy. In an interconnected world, this so-called autonomy is contingent on the ability of different governments to cooperate effectively. No single country, even one endowed with significant scientific or financial resources, can independently fulfill certain now-essential functions. These include global disease surveillance, the rapid dissemination of health data, the harmonization of medical practices, and the coordination of responses to crises.

Anticipating Threats Before They Reach French Shores

The WHO’s primary utility lies in its capacity to organize a permanent global health surveillance system. The International Health Regulations (IHR), revised in 2005 and adopted by 196 states, with subsequent amendments, stipulate that signatories must promptly report any event that could constitute a threat to global public health. This crucial framework, last updated in 2024, ensures a foundational level of transparency and information sharing.

These reports are then centralized and analyzed by the WHO, which evaluates the risks and, when necessary, coordinates an international response. This system yields tangible benefits for France. It allows for the anticipation of emerging threats, enabling the adaptation of hospital capacities, the securing of strategic supplies, and the adjustment of public health recommendations.

It is always challenging to quantify the "cost of non-cooperation." However, one can only speculate about the implications for France had there been a lack of coordination with other nations during the COVID-19 pandemic. Consider the potential delays in identifying new variants without the global network of laboratories involved in analyzing genetic sequences of viral material collected from diverse field samples.

The episode involving the Andes hantavirus, reported in Argentina in the second quarter of 2026, serves as another pertinent example of the value of such coordination. From the first suspected cases, international surveillance networks facilitated the rapid sharing of epidemiological and genetic data concerning the virus. This accelerated flow of information allowed European health authorities to immediately strengthen their vigilance.

A similar dynamic was observed in the same year during the outbreak of Ebola virus disease in the Democratic Republic of Congo. This outbreak was swiftly declared a "Public Health Emergency of International Concern" by the WHO. By coordinating exchanges between laboratories, governments, and health organizations, the WHO facilitated the deployment of specialized teams and the activation of international response mechanisms.

These crises underscore a frequently overlooked reality: the health security of high-income countries is directly dependent on the surveillance and care capacities of the most vulnerable nations. In the realm of health, local vulnerabilities can rapidly escalate into global consequences.

This capacity for anticipation also relies on a vast global network of laboratories and collaborating centers that continuously monitor the evolution of pathogens. The case of seasonal influenza provides a concrete illustration: each year, the composition of influenza vaccines is adjusted based on data collected worldwide. Without this cooperation, coordinated by the WHO, vaccines would be significantly less effective.

Generating Global Health Intelligence

The WHO’s role extends beyond crisis management. It plays a central part in the production and circulation of scientific knowledge on a global scale. Today, public health decisions are informed by incredibly complex data, including disease trends, the impact of pollution, treatment efficacy, and the effects of climate change on health. No single country can independently generate such a volume of information or possess all the necessary experiential feedback.

One of the WHO’s essential functions is precisely to aggregate this global data, compare it, and transform it into actionable recommendations. For instance, the air quality thresholds published by the WHO now serve as a reference for evaluating health risks associated with atmospheric pollution. In France, these recommendations are utilized by Santé publique France (French Public Health Agency) to estimate the anticipated benefits of pollution reduction policies.

Another significant example is the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), based in Lyon and affiliated with the WHO. IARC plays a global role in evaluating carcinogenic substances. Public authorities can then rely on these classifications to update their legislation, whether by regulating certain products, directing research funding, or strengthening prevention policies.

The WHO also facilitates the identification of the most effective medical practices by drawing on the experiences of different countries. Strategies for human papillomavirus (HPV) screening, when compared internationally, have contributed to evolving the recommendations of the French High Authority for Health (Haute Autorité de Santé) regarding cervical cancer screening.

An Organization Essential to the Daily Functioning of Health Systems

The WHO’s utility is not confined to health crises or scientific expertise; it also contributes to the practical functioning of health systems. One of the most significant examples is the International Classification of Diseases (ICD). Published by the WHO, the ICD is used daily in hospitals and health administrations. This common language standardizes the coding of diseases and medical procedures, facilitating healthcare financing, the compilation of health statistics, and data comparison between countries.

The WHO also plays a major role in coordinating public policies when issues transcend national borders. For instance, in matters concerning the links between human health, animal health, and environmental health, the organization ensures coordination with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH), and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).

The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) is another prime example. This international treaty has harmonized policies to combat smoking, particularly regarding advertising and labeling.

In the pharmaceutical sector, thanks to international pharmacovigilance networks coordinated by the WHO, adverse effects detected in certain countries can be rapidly reported to health authorities worldwide, including in France. In a globalized pharmaceutical market, this rapid circulation of information directly contributes to patient safety.

An Invisible but Essential Infrastructure

Infectious diseases, pollution, drug shortages, and pharmaceutical supply chains do not respect national borders. For French citizens, the WHO’s utility is daily, even if it often remains invisible: improved crisis anticipation, safer healthcare, more informed public decisions, and more effective regulation of health markets.

Current debates surrounding the WHO highlight a central political question: how can populations be effectively protected in a world where health risks transcend national borders? The WHO does not replace states; rather, it enables their action in an interdependent world. Weakening this cooperation would not strengthen national health sovereignty; on the contrary, it would increase collective vulnerability.

Authors: Stéphanie Tchiombiano, Associate Professor in the Political Science Department, University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne; Marie-Paule Kieny, virologist, vaccinologist, and French public health expert.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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